The 2021 State Duma Elections

The State Duma election in September 2021 was a mere formality because any political opposition independent of Russia’s central government had been completely barred from the election. In terms of restriction of free speech and repression of the opposition, the 2021 State Duma election can be considered the most undemocratic in Vladimir Putin’s years in power. Formally, the election fits the mould of the Russian ruling elite’s well-worn practice of imitating the democratic process, but in reality, political legitimacy has significantly diminished. This is another trend indicating a growing similarity between the current political regime’s modus operandi and that of the Soviet regime.

To manipulate election results and to completely neutralise political competition, essentially the same methods were used as in previous years. Still, several elements were applied much more aggressively than ever before. The main methods used were:

• Administrative tools to suppress the political opposition’s organised activities. These were utilised more intensively in 2021 than before.
• Barring unwanted candidates from participating in the election using formal pretexts. This has long been one of the ruling elite’s most effective tools to ensure election results. The first serious setback in the use of this tool only occurred during the Moscow City Duma election in 2019.
• Biased media coverage of political parties and the muzzling of media outlets broadcasting views unsuitable for the power elite – another tool used much more forcefully in 2021.
• Direct support from the state apparatus to United Russia.
• “Administrative mobilisation” or pressuring state employees to vote as required.
• Obstruction of independent election observation.
• Falsifying election results.

The official results of the State Duma election were as expected – with the help of manipulation, a constitutional majority was ensured for the ruling political party, United Russia. The lower number of seats in the Duma compared with the 2016 election is explained by the ruling elite’s heightened caution due to the recent presidential election experience in Belarus. Given United Russia’s modest ratings, they shied away from announcing the same result as in the previous Duma election.

While Vladimir Putin’s personal electoral ratings have consistently been higher than those of Russian governmental institutions, they have also started to dip downwards in the last few years. The chart below visualizes this trend. As opinion polls are used by those in power to gauge the societal mood, it’s undoubtedly true that growing repression in society is a reflection of the negative numbers: if other methods do not work, a heavy-handed response is deemed necessary to hold onto power. Putin’s waning support also shows that assertions of Putin’s perpetual reign or support that is autonomous of anything happening within Russia do not ring true.

In our assessment, manipulation played a decisive role in achieving an election result suitable for the ruling elite. United Russia would certainly not be able to succeed at a comparable level if faced with real political competition without administrative support or a biased, controlled state media. The ruling elite’s efforts to restrict free speech and repressing the opposition in 2021 are as convincing a proof of this as can be.