The Kremlin’s mask diplomacy stunt in Italy was rendered
more cynical by the fact that, at the same time, Russia’s
medical staff was already suffering from a lack of
protective equipment. In many places, hospital workers were
forced to fight the virus without masks and other protective
equipment.
When the Kremlin itself was finally forced to use
diplomatic channels to ask for help with mask supplies from
other countries, including Italy, the primary concern of the
diplomatic corps were the optics of a major provider of aid
suddenly appearing to reclaim its aid supplies.
The goal of Russia’s influence operations is to show itself
as a powerful force who is ready and able to alleviate the
global crisis.
The diplomats’ concerns were justified because the broader
goal of Russia’s influence operations during the first wave
of the pandemic was to bring the country to the forefront of
the global fight against the coronavirus – to show itself as
a powerful force ready and able to alleviate the global
crisis.
These efforts culminated in August 2020 as President
Vladimir Putin announced that Russian scientists had
produced the world’s first efficient COVID-19
vaccine.
Vaccine marketing the Russian way
In parallel with reports of the launch of Russia’s first
COVID-19 vaccine, Sputnik V, the Kremlin triggered its
state-controlled arsenal of influence measures, the most
notable of which was a large-scale concealed smear campaign
against rival Western vaccines.
The campaign, led by the Russian Direct Investment Fund
(RDIF), which oversaw Sputnik V’s production and supply
agreements, and its head Kirill Dmitriev, who is close to
Putin, was not only designed to promote Sputnik V but also
to highlight the potential health threats posed by Western
vaccines.
Launched publicly in Russia’s state media and covertly in
the global social media sphere, the campaign focused on
memes with discrediting content that were supposed to look
like a citizens’ initiative reflecting widespread public
opposition to “suspicious” Western vaccines. The campaign
was primarily targeted at major developing countries, such
as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, India, Egypt and
Indonesia.
The power of the Kremlin’s dark PR was most strongly felt
by the British pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, whose
vaccine, developed in collaboration with Oxford University
scientists, was dubbed the “monkey vaccine” by Kremlin
propaganda. To improve the vaccine’s public image, the name was changed
to Vaxzevria.
It is important to note that the choice of AstraZeneca as a
target was far from random. At the time, it was among the
most promising Western vaccines, with the greatest number of
global advance supply agreements in place.
The smear campaign was backed by spectacular Sputnik V
propaganda events for foreign medical experts as well as
supply negotiations, which had become commonplace for
Russian diplomats. RDIF management guidelines stipulated
that it be explicitly emphasised that there is a risk of
getting poor vaccines from the West that have not been
tested on humans.
To help with its vaccine diplomacy efforts, the Kremlin
also deployed an extensive network of influential
individuals ready to lobby Sputnik V with the encouragement
of the Russian authorities. These included Russian oligarchs
with contacts abroad, former top politicians in the West, as
well as prominent figures from business and entertainment
communities around the world. The latter included people
such as Argentine millionaire and film producer Fernando
Sulichin, who acted as the Kremlin’s salesman in vaccine
talks with the Argentine and Brazilian authorities, and with
whom there were serious plans of producing a documentary
film about the triumph of Sputnik V, to be directed by
Sulichin’s close friend, Hollywood director Oliver Stone,
who has himself successfully worked with the Kremlin in the
past.
Setbacks
The Kremlin’s vaccine diplomacy efforts and widely
publicised supply agreements for hundreds of millions of
vaccine doses convey the impression of Russia’s success in
the fight against coronavirus. The reality however is
different. Various machinations may have ensured initial
reputational success, but maintaining this seems extremely
difficult, if not impossible.
Many countries have received only a small fraction of the
vaccine supplies promised to them, and some none at
all.
As early as April 2021, the RDIF found itself backed into a
corner with supply agreements. Due to the lack of sufficient
production capacity, it had to begin rescheduling agreements
and reducing delivery volumes. Many countries have received
only a small fraction of the vaccine supplies promised to
them, and some none at all.
Things have reached a point where foreign supply obligations
are being met at the expense of Russia’s domestic vaccine
stocks: to calm foreign markets, and under pressure from the
Russian Security Council, “extra doses” have been taken from
vaccine stocks originally intended for Russia’s domestic
population. Such opportunism clearly shows where the real
priorities of the Russian power elite lie in this crisis.