THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Russia’s full-scale war of conquest in Ukraine, which started
in the early morning of 24 February 2022, shook the status quo
of European security and is part of Putin’s broader goal of
reshaping the European security architecture.
Putin revealed his real objectives on 17 December 2021 when
Russia submitted a draft security agreement to NATO and the
US, listing demands to change the fundamentals of European
security, which also included Ukraine. The most important
points were:
- ending NATO’s “open door” policy
-
rolling NATO’s military deployment back to the 1997 line
On 24 February 2022, Putin began implementing his objectives
with a full-scale military attack against Ukraine. Putin
likely sees defeating Ukraine as a prerequisite for achieving
his broader goals. Russia expected to defeat Ukraine in a
matter of days. Things turned out differently because Russia
had miscalculated. Russia’s systemic weaknesses – constant
lying and stealing within the state apparatus – painted a
false picture of the situation in Ukraine for the Russian
leadership.
The demands presented to NATO and the US indicate Russia’s
long-term goal of reshaping the European security environment
into one where NATO would not have a leading role. With this
in mind, the military pre-positioning of NATO allies in
Eastern Europe, their immediate combat readiness, logistics
and supply continuity is of utmost importance.
Ukraine’s political and military capitulation remains
Putin’s objective, and he will go as far as he is allowed to
achieve it.
By now, Putin has made it very complicated for Russia to exit
the war – from a foreign policy perspective, by illegally
annexing regions of Ukraine, and in domestic policy terms, by
declaring mobilisation in the country. Ukraine’s political and
military capitulation remains Putin’s objective, and he will
go as far as he is allowed to achieve it. But the time frame
has changed: a quick regime change has turned into a long war
of attrition, with possible periods of low-intensity military
action. In our assessment, Putin believes that Ukraine’s
resilience and Western support will break before Russia will.
Still, in Putin’s opinion, Ukraine has not yet currently
suffered enough to reach breaking point. Part of Putin’s
defeat strategy is to systematically damage Ukraine’s energy
infrastructure during winter, and the goal is to destroy it.
Continued military and economic aid from the West to Ukraine
is therefore vital to avoid a humanitarian disaster for the
civilian population, prevent new crimes against humanity, and
ensure Ukraine’s survival as a democratic state. European
security in the medium term directly depends on the
Ukrainians’ will to determine their own future and Western
unity in supporting Ukraine with all necessary means.
According to our information, Russia is not ready to give up
the territories it has occupied. It expects an exhausted
Ukraine to sit at the negotiating table eventually. Once
there, Russia expects to be able to present its conditions
and, as a strong negotiator, come out of the situation on the
winning side.
According to our sources, Western unity in imposing sanctions
has been an unpleasant surprise to the Russian leadership.
Those under sanctions seek to use their connections in the
West to get off the list, while those threatened with
sanctions try to stay off the list. Russia wants the sanctions
to end. The sanctions imposed on Russia are not
inconsequential but directly affect Russia’s ability to
maintain its war machine and keep its economy functioning.