FSB military counterintelligence: Beyond countering terrorists and foreign spies

Military counterintelligence (военная контрразведка, VKR) refers to a specialised structure within the FSB (Federal Security Service), Russia’s largest and most influential security agency. VKR performs nearly all the functions across the military and paramilitary institutions that the broader FSB executes across Russian society. Despite its name, VKR’s remit extends far beyond military counterintelligence, encompassing broader responsibilities and a wider operational scope.

RESPONSIBILITIES

VKR ensures security across Russia’s defence-related institutions, including the Ministry of Defence, military training and research facilities, and the headquarters of all military branches and units at all levels – both domestically and abroad. This includes units stationed overseas, whether present under international agreements or engaged in acts of aggression. VKR also operates within the GRU (military intelligence), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the National Guard, the Federal Protective Service (FSO) and militarised rescue units of the Ministry of Emergency Situations.

VKR officers are also tasked with securing Russian military units abroad. For example, prior to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, a VKR operational group constituted part of the regime and security service within the Black Sea Fleet’s headquarters. VKR officers are similarly deployed in the ongoing war against Ukraine, providing security for Russian forces under the coordination of a temporary operational group, “South” (VOG “Yug”), within the Southern Military District’s military counterintelligence directorate. In the role of aggressor, VKR officers face challenges akin to those of regular troops, including equipment shortages, delays in pay and significant casualties.

Officers serving in VKR units are trained at the FSB Academy, where they can complete bachelor’s-level counterintelligence education or pursue short-term courses in intelligence operations. VKR officers can also pursue education at the Novosibirsk FSB Institute, where they undergo counterintelligence training, or at the Yekaterinburg FSB Institute, which offers further studies in state secrets protection. Graduates of counterintelligence programmes at the FSB Academy and the Novosibirsk FSB Institute receive diplomas formally designating their field of study as “lawyer”, a standard nomenclature for counterintelligence professionals trained at FSB educational institutions.

VKR’s responsibilities are outlined in its official charter base.garant.ru/181675[5]– a public document approved by the Russian president – are as follows:

• Countering foreign intelligence activities, both broadly across Russia and specifically targeting organisations under VKR’s jurisdiction – that is, counterintelligence.
  Example: VKR is informed of international contacts and visits involving Russian Armed Forces institutions and units. Beyond counterintelligence, VKR can direct military offi cers to gather intelligence on guests or hosts or to profile members of foreign delegations. VKR offi cers posing as military personnel were frequent participants in visits conducted under the Treaty on Open Skies.
• Collecting intelligence on threats to Russia in VKR’s areas of responsibility, in cooperation with other Russian security and intelligence agencies and partner services in allied states, and informing the president and national or regional authorities about such threats. This also includes infiltrating foreign intelligence agencies and other organisations.
  Example: During the Chechen wars, VKR’s operational group (OG DVKR) participated in “anti-terrorist operations” in conflict zones, which included intelligence collection. Serving in conflict zones – referred to in VKR slang as “areas with complex operational situations” – is also a prerequisite for advancing a career within VKR.
• Preventing terrorism, sabotage and the illegal use of weapons of mass destruction in organisations under VKR’s jurisdiction.
• Ensuring state secret protection in cooperation with other state agencies within VKR’s jurisdiction. This includes issuing state secret clearance, granting permission for foreign travel, regulating the entry of foreign nationals into Russian territory, securing confidential communications and countering foreign technical intelligence efforts.
• Combating organised crime, corruption, smuggling, illicit arms trade and specialised equipment, and drug trafficking in collaboration with other state agencies, as well as fighting illegal armed groups, criminal organisations and attempts to overthrow the government by force within VKR’s jurisdiction.
  Example: VKR officers have participated in Ministry of Defence working groups overseeing Russian elections under the framework titled “Coordination of FSB and Ministry of Defence activities in preparing and conducting elections. Countering extremist political parties and movements and terrorism”. Given that all genuinely oppositional parties and movements – described as the “non-systemic opposition” – are officially declared extremist in Russia, VKR’s involvement in organising elections goes beyond ensuring election security; it also facilitates achieving election outcomes favourable to the regime.

To fulfil the tasks listed above, VKR officers may establish connections with individuals who agree to cooperate – that is, they are authorised to recruit covert collaborators or agents.

STRUCTURE

At the FSB headquarters, military counterintelligence is overseen by the Department of Military Counterintelligence (Департамент Военной Контрразведки – DVKR or Military Unit No 14057, also known as the FSB Third Department). The DVKR is one of the highest-level structural units within the FSB and reports directly to the FSB leadership. The DVKR is divided into functional departments (отдел), which are responsible for counterintelligence in specific branches of the armed forces, other institutions within the military structure (such as the GRU) or other supervised organisations. These functional departments are further divided into divisions (направление), sections (отделение) and so on. The DVKR also includes units such as the Investigation Directorate, which handles criminal investigations within the armed forces; the Analysis Department; the Personnel Department; the Registration and Archive Funds Department, which coordinates security clearances and foreign travel for officers; and a secretariat.

As with other FSB units, the VKR deploys undercover officers (known as APSs Abbreviation of <em>аппарат прикомандированных</em> <em>сотрудников</em>, which refers to seconded personnel or staff assigned to another institution.[5]) to work within the organisations it is tasked with securing. For example, DVKR officers have worked in the Ministry of Defence as aides to deputy ministers and chancellors.

In the structure of military districts (MDs) and fleet headquarters, FSB directorates (UFSBs) coordinate military counterintelligence activities within their respective districts or fleets.

Until spring 2024, the Western MD UFSB oversaw military counterintelligence in the Western MD, with both the Western MD Headquarters and UFSB located in Saint Petersburg. However, in February 2024, the Western MD was divided into two districts: the Leningrad MD and the Moscow MD. As a result, the Leningrad MD UFSB was established. This change is largely formal, as the Leningrad MD UFSB uses the same legal registration number as the former Western MD UFSB, remains under the leadership of the same officer, Aleksey Pushkarev and operates from the same address in Saint Petersburg: officially Liteiny Prospekt 4 (the headquarters address of the UFSB for Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region), but actually Ulitsa Mira 20.

FSB departments (OFSBs) exist within individual military units, from the largest to the smallest, and are divided into investigative and operational branches. On a daily basis, OFSB officers (known as osobisty) in military units work to prevent terrorist acts, address internal confl icts among military personnel, combat extremism (including the “non-systemic opposition”) and economic crimes, prevent drug use, and ensure adherence to classified information handling requirements, including preventing unauthorised use of communication devices.

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The VKR charter does not specify the nationalities from which VKR officers may recruit agents, but according to our information, attempts are made to recruit informants among both Russian and foreign citizens. Like other FSB units involved in intelligence gathering, the VKR’s preferred method is “intelligence from the territory”. This approach consists of initiating contact with the target, recruiting them to work on behalf of VKR and maintaining regular contact with them within Russian territory. Since VKR officers rarely travel abroad themselves, they rely on Russian agents to establish and maintain relationships with foreign targets outside Russia.

The intelligence interests of VKR counterintelligence officers are broad. Regarding Western nations, they focus on internal political situations, defence policies (including NATO alliances), intelligence agency capabilities and the personal profiles of key individuals involved in these areas.

The collection of intelligence on foreign countries is primarily conducted by regional intelligence centres within the UFSBs located in the headquarters of Russian military districts.

VKR officers responsible for the security of Russian military units stationed abroad also engage in intelligence collection. These units are typically based in allied countries, where the operational environment facilitates interactions with partners, local residents and foreign nationals without fear of interference from local counterintelligence services.

VKR officers are also embedded in Russian diplomatic missions. For example, Dmitry Filippenok, declared persona non grata and expelled from Belgium in October 2021 along with several other “diplomats” working at Russia’s NATO mission in Brussels, had previously served in the Western MD UFSB (Military Unit 55297), according to a Dossier Centre article.[6] The article suggests Filippenok’s primary responsibility was not spying on NATO but ensuring the security of Russian personnel at the mission, which would be a foreign counterintelligence role. However, this claim is questionable, as another VKR officer-diplomat at the same mission, Andrei Esiotr, who was stationed in Brussels in the mid-2010s before Filippenok, was directly involved in intelligence gathering.

Another example of VKR’s intelligence capabilities involves a case from a few years ago when local FSB directorates (UFSBs) within a Russian federal district were required to report on their activities related to China as part of the comprehensive plan Amur. A review of the data revealed that the SR UFSB in the region – the military counterintelligence branch – had the largest number of agents collecting intelligence on China. The high intelligence-gathering capacity of military counterintelligence officers is partly explained by their access to personnel records of all soldiers and officers serving or having served in Russian military units within their region. This allows VKR officers to recruit informants or agents with the desired profiles for intelligence purposes based on language skills, personal traits, education or employment.