Russia is committed to advancing drone technology

Drawing on lessons and experiences from the war in Ukraine, the Russian government is determined to ensure technological and industrial readiness for the large-scale adoption of drone technology The term “drone” is used here as a general designation for unmanned vehicles, including unmanned aerial, ground and water vehicles, as well as one-way unmanned attack systems, loitering munitions, FPV drones and similar devices.[1] in both military and civilian sectors.

RUSSIA’S PLANS FOR CIVIL-SECTOR DRONE DEVELOPMENT

The development and production of drones are very likely a top priority for Russia, as demonstrated by the launch of a national drone development project (Национальный Проект БАС). This initiative is divided into five federal subprojects:

1. stimulating demand for domestically produced drones,
2. standardising the drone industry and ensuring mass production,
3. developing drone industry infrastructure, safety assurance and certification processes,
4. securing qualified personnel for the drone sector,
5. and advancing cutting-edge drone technologies.

Under the national drone development project, drones are being developed and produced based on standardised types, sizes and functions (e.g. light, medium or heavy drones of the airplane, multirotor or helicopter type designed for transport, training or reconnaissance purposes). To ensure standardised production and development, the project aims to establish 48 research and production centres (Научно-производственный Центр), across Russia. These centres will provide shared laboratory and production equipment, along with facilities for development, testing and production, as well as support personnel for participating enterprises. Russia plans to allocate on average €1 billion annually to this project until 2030, with the aim of creating one million jobs for experts in the sector, who will be registered in a national electronic database. The project also includes the goal of integrating drone-related education into 75% of Russian schools.

Lessons from the war in Ukraine and the national drone development project will likely provide Russia’s armed forces with a strong position in future conflicts.

The national drone development project likely reflects both economic ambitions and an intent to emulate China’s model, where civilian initiatives for new technologies and production capacities also facilitate rapid and cost-efficient transfers to the military sector. By centralising the integration of private enterprise with this state-led project, the Russian government likely aims to establish complete control over development and production resources, specialist personnel and the resulting technologies. Research and development centres are envisioned as innovation hubs designed to help Russia achieve “technological sovereignty” and reduce its dependency on Western technologies and imported components. The creation of an electronic database of industry experts mirrors the practices across Russia’s broader military-industrial complex, where cross-sectoral databases enable the identification and allocation of critical personnel as required. These initiatives, combined with lessons from the war in Ukraine, will likely secure a strong position for the Russian armed forces in the long-term deployment of drone technology.

RUSSIA’S USE OF LONG-RANGE STRIKE DRONES IN UKRAINE

Russia has extensively deployed one-way attack drones (NATO designation: OWA UAS) in its war against Ukraine. These drones merge loitering munitions with unmanned aerial strike systems, creating a precision-strike platform capable of serving both tactical and strategic purposes, depending on their application.

As of December 2024, Russia has used over 8,000 Shahed, Geran and Garpiya drones in Ukraine, targeting critical infrastructure in massive waves combined with other precision weapons, such as ballistic and cruise missiles. This terror tactic aims to undermine Ukrainian morale. From Russia’s perspective, targeting civilian infrastructure also increases the likelihood that Ukraine will expend its limited stock of air defence resources to intercept drones. Thus, one-way attack drones can also serve as saturation decoys for Ukraine’s air defences so that Russia’s more expensive and capable ballistic and cruise missiles can reach their intended military targets.

The Shahed series of one-way attack drones, produced by Iran, has been sold to Russia in large quantities. The extensive use of Shahed drones against Ukraine has been well-documented through video evidence and physical remnants; however, a key source of information emerged on 4 February 2024, when the PRANA Network hacker group leaked the email servers of Sahara Thunder, a purported front company for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. The leaked documents revealed that Iran initially offered Shahed-136 drones to Russia at a price of $375,000 per unit. Following negotiations, the parties agreed on a reduced price of $193,000 per drone for a bulk purchase of 6,000 units, or $290,000 per drone for a batch of 2,000 units. The price quoted by Iran is vastly higher than the estimated production cost, indicating that, for Iran, the Shahed drone sales were primarily an economic transaction. For Russia, accepting such a high price reveals its urgent need for these drones.

Russia also produces a modified version of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone under the name Geran-2 in Tatarstan’s Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Compared with the original, the Geran-2 incorporates several modifications, including the use of more advanced materials. It features an improved navigation and control module assembled in Russia, which includes the adaptive Kometa antenna (see below) to enhance its resistance to Ukraine’s electronic warfare systems. Reports estimate the production cost of one Geran-2 drone in Russia at $48,800, which is significantly less than the cost of importing a Shahed-136 from Iran.

In late 2022, a group of Russian defence industry companies, led by the Almaz-Antei conglomerate, began developing a domestically produced one-way attack drone, the Garpiya A1. This drone shares many components, including its engine, with the Iranian Shahed-136 drone and its Russian-manufactured version, the Geran-2, produced in Alabuga. The Garpiya A1 is nearly identical to these models in appearance and technical specifications. It is highly likely a case of reverse engineering the Iranian Shahed-136 in Russia, with the apparent goal of lowering the costs of acquiring one-way attack drones.

Russia will likely apply lessons from the Ukraine war to shape the development of its forces along NATO’s eastern flank.

The Garpiya is undergoing upgrades, including new targeting systems to improve autonomy, accuracy and lethality. Plans for a jet-powered version promise greater speed and altitude, making it a more challenging target for Ukrainian air defences. The advancement of one-way attack drones, particularly jet-powered versions, blurs the line between drones and cruise missiles and offers similar capabilities at a fraction of the cost, almost certainly enhancing the scale and effectiveness of precision-strike campaigns in future conflicts. After the conclusion of active hostilities in Ukraine, Russia will likely use its drone warfare experience and insights into Western air defence systems to shape the development of its forces along Estonian and NATO borders.

KOMETA ADAPTIVE ANTENNAS ARE INSTALLED ON BOTH NEW AND EXISTING PRECISION WEAPON SYSTEMS

The Kometa controlled reception pattern antenna (CRPA), widely used in Russian Armed Forces equipment, ensures resilience against jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals GPS signal jamming is a technical attack against devices or signals that use the global navigation system (GPS), aimed<br /> at disrupting their operation. GPS signal spoofing, on the other hand, is an attack designed to distort the GPS receiver’s<br /> location determination, causing the system to display an incorrect position.[2]. Various versions of the Kometa antenna are fitted on virtually all Russian weapon systems that rely on GNSS signals, including ballistic and cruise missiles, glide bombs and drones such as the Geran-2 and Garpiya A1.

Each element of the CRPA receiver processes signals with specific delays and phase shifts based on the direction and wavelength of incoming signals, as well as the relative positioning of the elements. This enables the system to identify and counteract interference by adjusting the antenna’s reception pattern to avoid disruptive signals.

The Kometa CRPA receivers very likely enhance the resilience of Russian weapon systems, including one-way attack drones, against Ukraine’s electronic warfare efforts to disrupt GNSS signal reception. This capability enables Russia’s armed forces to carry out more accurate and devastating strikes. The reduced effectiveness of electronic warfare in disrupting navigation signals heightens the need for alternative capabilities, such as kinetic strike options, within air defence systems. Additionally, Kometa’s proven performance and operational experience during Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is a factor Estonia must consider when acquiring precision munitions and drones, as well as when developing countermeasures. The mass production of Kometa antennas will enable Russia to equip both new and existing systems with this technology, reducing the impact of adversary electronic warfare measures on its operational capabilities.

Operating principle of the Kometa adaptive antenna system

RUSSIA’S DRONE PRODUCTION, SANCTIONS AND COOPERATION WITH CHINA

The Russian Ministry of Defence set an ambitious target to reach a production rate of 100,000 drones per month by the end of 2024 to support its so-called special military operation in Ukraine. To achieve this, numerous federal and regional support initiatives and funding schemes were launched. Most of the drones produced are FPV (first-person view) light multirotor drones with military functionality. It remains unclear whether Russia achieved this goal in 2024, but available information indicates that monthly production volumes grew several-fold over the year. Furthermore, Russia is likely capable of scaling up its one-way attack drone production faster than Ukraine can strengthen its countermeasures.

Russia’s drone industry remains reliant on imported components, particularly electronics and drone motors and engines, for which no domestic alternatives exist. These components are largely sourced from Western manufacturers. However, manufacturers’ ability to monitor end users is limited, as components are sold in bulk to electronic wholesalers, who then distribute them to end users and retailers worldwide. Russia has built procurement networks to exploit these supply chains, constantly seeking opportunities to acquire sanctioned items by involving companies from various countries as intermediaries to conceal Russia’s role as the end user. As a result, the burden of ensuring compliance with sanctions falls more heavily on wholesalers than on the component manufacturers themselves.

Sanctions have had a limited impact on Russian drone production. Russia’s military-industrial complex continues to access critical components via intermediaries. Estimates indicate that up to 80 per cent of sanctioned Western components reach Russia through China, suggesting that representatives of manufacturers, wholesalers and intermediaries within China are almost certainly a weak link in the supply chain. China has made some efforts to restrict its state-owned and state-associated entities from supplying sanctioned goods to Russia. It has also tightened existing restrictions and introduced new ones, such as the Chinese Ministry of Commerce’s export controls on certain drones and drone components imposed on 1 September 2023. Despite this, covert supplies from Chinese private companies persist, with Beijing remaining Russia’s primary hub for importing high-tech and dual-use goods.

China continues to enable covert transfers of dual-use components to Russia.

Dependency on imported components, including drone motors and engines, has been one of the most significant challenges to developing Russia’s domestic drone production. Potential transfers of drone technology from China to Russia through private-sector collaboration could significantly decrease Russia’s dependence on foreign suppliers. Although the Chinese government likely seeks to avoid the direct involvement of its state institutions in supplying sanctioned goods to Russia, it facilitates bilateral cooperation and covert transfers of dual-use components through private companies. This approach will likely decrease Russia’s dependency on Western components and, in the long term, could undermine the West’s ability to leverage influence in this domain.