Russia only intimidates with nuclear weapons

Persistent concerns about potential nuclear escalation have accompanied Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. These concerns are exacerbated by Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons, which departs from traditional deterrence – ensuring balance and preventing use – to intimidation aimed at expanding Russia’s influence and control. Russia does not behave as a responsible nuclear state; instead, it uses the threat of nuclear weapons to intimidate not just Ukraine but also the rest of Europe. This approach remains rooted in the Kremlin’s December 2021 ultimatum to reshape European security architecture in its favour. A prominent example of nuclear intimidation was Putin’s declaration of a “special regime for nuclear forces” at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – a declaration that never translated into concrete actions. Operational patterns and unit tasks remained unchanged, rendering the special regime meaningless. Throughout the war, Russia has announced multiple “red lines”, such as Ukraine striking Crimea or receiving Western military aid like tanks, F-16 fighter jets, HIMARS or ATACMS. None of these scenarios has resulted in nuclear escalation.

Russia’s aggressive rhetoric, paired with its lack of response to Western actions, has undermined the credibility of its 2020 nuclear doctrine. Russia has issued warnings of nuclear escalation in situations that fall short of the thresholds outlined in the doctrine. Following this discreditation and Russia’s inability to deter the West, discussions within Russia’s security circles intensified after the initial setbacks of the invasion. Both public and private debates focused on finding more effective ways to leverage nuclear weapons as a deterrent.

These discussions culminated in the adoption of a new doctrine on 19 November 2024. On paper, the changes lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use. However, such doctrines carry little weight in an autocratic system like Russia’s, where their primary function is to create an alarming notion in the West that the choice lies between submission and nuclear war. This doctrinal change is highly unlikely to lead to the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine under current conditions. The use of nuclear weapons is almost certainly not automatically tied to the conditions outlined in doctrine but depends on the decisions of the Russian regime’s leader.

By lowering the threshold for nuclear weapon use and continuing its intimidation tactics, Russia aims to influence Western policymakers. This includes deterring support for Ukraine and discouraging NATO from strengthening its defence capabilities near Russian borders. Intimidation has yielded some results; while Ukraine continues to receive support despite Russian threats, many countries have adopted measured approaches, creating self-imposed “red lines” that Russia can exploit.

The success of these intimidation tactics primarily hinges on the reactions of Western nations and the global community. If nuclear threats or limited use were successful in deterring Western aid to Ukraine and securing concessions for Russia, this would likely spark a wave of nuclear proliferation, with non-nuclear states increasingly viewing non-strategic nuclear weapons as a primary security guarantee.

THE LIMITED UTILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

Alongside intimidation, Russia is likely revising the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons (operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons) in practice. Russia’s new and expanded force structure along its western flank (see section on Russian military reform, p. 8) includes a non-strategic nuclear component. Exercises in the summer of 2024 covered practical aspects such as the transportation, protection and potential use of nuclear weapons, including in Kaliningrad.

Traditionally, Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons have been stored in large national depots. In crises or wartime, they are moved closer to conflict zones or delivery platforms into what are known as “local depots”. The nearest national depot to Estonia is 600 km away, near Vologda, while the closest local depot is in Kaliningrad, just 400 km away. The Kaliningrad depot, previously in disrepair, has been renovated and expanded, becoming a focal point for Russia’s 12th Main Directorate (12th GUMO), which oversees nuclear weapons. In 2024, it was upgraded to a national depot, which positions nuclear warheads and delivery systems closer to the Baltic states and reduces the early warning time for potential use. This likely indicates a shift in Russia’s threat perception, intended both to further intimidate the West and to allow for faster deployment if required.

However, the military benefits of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield are limited in modern warfare. Using nuclear weapons against Ukraine would almost certainly fail to achieve strategic objectives and would instead expose the limitations of non-strategic nuclear weapons. It would highlight the superiority of modern conventional weaponry and significantly erode Russia’s nuclear deterrence credibility. Nuclear weapons and the taboo surrounding their use remain central to Russia’s reputation and self-perception as a great power. Any use of these weapons would shatter this illusory status on the international stage, including among the Global South.