China’s narratives on the war in Ukraine

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, ideological and media cooperation between China and Russia has become closer and more focused. This cooperation is coordinated at the highest political levels, with particular emphasis on news dissemination. A key goal is to present the war in Ukraine in a pro-Russian light within China’s tightly controlled public information space. However, despite the growing alignment and shared worldview between the two countries, China selectively adopts Kremlin propaganda narratives that serve its strategic objectives and disregards those that do not. As a result, the carefully curated narratives about the war circulating in China’s tightly controlled information sphere often reveal more about Beijing’s true stance than the typically vague and ambiguously worded official statements issued by its leadership.

China’s strategic narratives – those reflecting the authorities’ overarching political beliefs and long-term objectives – widely portray the war not as Russian aggression against Ukraine but as a conflict between Russia and the US and its allies, who are allegedly using Ukraine as a proxy to expand NATO and increase their influence in the region at the expense of Russian interests. In this narrative, Russia is depicted as having been compelled to initiate its “special military operation” as a preventive action.

A similar perspective shapes Chinese media coverage of NATO’s growing security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries. Over the past year, this has coincided with a marked escalation in NATO-critical rhetoric.

USING RUSSIAN VOCABULARY

In China’s view, global leadership rests with major powers representing ancient civilisations, which have the right to shape the fate of smaller nations.

Although China officially recognises Ukraine’s sovereignty and does not recognise Crimea or the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine as part of Russia, it emphasises Russia’s alleged security concerns while downplaying the security threats faced by Ukraine. Moreover, China questions Ukraine’s right to join alliances, reinforcing the notion that Ukraine belongs to Russia’s sphere of influence. This perspective aligns with Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 2023 Global Civilisation Initiative, which envisions a world where leadership is divided among major powers that represent ancient civilisations, which grants them the authority to shape the fates of smaller nations.

When reporting on the war, Chinese media frequently uses Russian terminology, referring to the conflict as a “crisis” or “issue”, and avoids focusing on the destruction caused by Russia or condemning its actions. At the same time, Chinese media actively criticises the international sanctions imposed on Russia. Seeking to avoid significant economic loss, China formally adheres to the sanctions regime and has imposed its own restrictions in sectors such as finance and exports, such as limiting transfers to Russian companies via Chinese banks and controlling the export of drones and some of their components. However, by downplaying Russian responsibility and portraying sanctions as repressive measures, China implicitly endorses its citizens and companies conducting business with Russia, which has resulted in the proliferation of covert logistical and financial schemes that enable Russia’s military-industrial complex and economy to endure despite sanctions.

CHINA’S SUPPORT HELPS RUSSIA OFFSET SANCTIONS AND SUSTAIN ITS WAR EFFORT

The strategic narratives are supported by tactical narratives, which are often disjointed in content and structure, rely heavily on misinformation, and appeal more to emotions than reason. In China, most widely promoted tactical narratives are those that reinforce the central idea of its political discourse: the “great changes unseen in a century”, culminating in China’s rise as the world’s leading power to replace a declining United States.

These narratives portray China as a just and responsible superpower, contrasting Western divisive rhetoric by urging nations to contribute to building a “community with a shared future”. This concept underpins all of Xi Jinping’s global initiatives.

Reflecting Beijing’s priorities, Chinese media avoids echoing those aspects of Russian propaganda that are aimed at Russia’s domestic or diaspora audiences, including narratives promoting Soviet nostalgia or imperialism. Unlike Russia, China’s objective in Ukraine is not to destabilise the situation or spread fear and confusion. As a result, Russian tactical narratives that fuel myths of Ukrainian Russophobia or alleged genocide in Donbas, aimed at inciting ethnic hatred, rarely appear in Chinese media.

Instead, China promotes tactical narratives that resonate with domestic audiences and Global South nations. These narratives often find their way into Western information spaces via groups susceptible to populism and conspiracy theories. Criticism of Ukraine in these narratives focuses less on its resistance to Russia and more on its integration with the West, depicted as a consequence of the Western-orchestrated Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014. Examples include claims that Ukraine jeopardises global food security with the West’s backing and operates secret US-run bioweapons labs. These stories, typically absent from official Communist Party publications, spread through tabloids and social media, which authorities use to deepen anti-Western and nationalist sentiments.

Although much of the information about the war in Ukraine in Chinese media originates from Russian sources, it is heavily curated to align with Chinese authorities’ messaging. For example, Chinese tabloids have repeatedly provided a platform to Russian ultranationalist ideologue Aleksandr Dugin. However, the post in his Chinese language account in Chinese social media platform Weibo promising to reveal the unredacted truth about Ukraine was deleted by the censors, confirming that ultimate narrative control rests with Beijing.

NO EXCEPTIONS, EVEN FOR RUSSIA

Even high-profile figures are subject to this control. Before the 2023 Belt and Road Forum, Chinese state media broadcast an interview with Vladimir Putin, but only the segments highlighting his friendship with Xi Jinping and criticism of US hegemony were aired; references to the war in Ukraine were cut entirely.

Occasionally, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Chinese scholars and think-tank experts have published critical analyses of Russia in both Chinese and English. These pieces often aim to distance China from Russia’s brutal methods, stressing Beijing’s desire to avoid jeopardising the prospect of improved relations with Europe or warning against the risks of deepening dependency on Russian resources. However, such views have no impact on decision-making within the Chinese Communist Party and are primarily designed to mislead external observers about the true nature of China-Russia relations.

China is highly likely to continue working to prevent Russia’s defeat.

To maintain its image as a peace-loving nation, China deliberately obscures its association with Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. However, this does not indicate a neutral stance, despite official claims to the contrary. The fact that China frames the war exclusively as a consequence of actions by the US and its allies underscores its lack of impartiality. China will likely continue to take various measures to prevent Russia’s defeat, as such an outcome would represent a victory for its primary rival, the US, and a setback to China’s efforts to reshape the rules-based international order to favour authoritarian regimes.

China’s narratives on the war in Ukraine consistently dismiss Ukraine as a genuinely sovereign nation capable of independent political decision-making, portraying it instead as a pawn in a game of global powers. China’s perspective would likely be the same if
Estonia were in Ukraine’s position.