The Chinese Communist Party pursues scientific collaboration opportunities

Collaborating with China on research projects requires a heightened focus on knowledge security to prevent sensitive information and technology from reaching Chinese research institutions, which could pass it on to Chinese businesses or the military sector. Unfortunately, China’s interest in advancing international scientific collaboration is often tied to the strategic and geopolitical objectives of the CCP.

Chinese universities are under strict party control. Party organisations within these institutions are not merely supervisory units; they play an active role in guiding and controlling research. These organisations often operate autonomously or hold a higher status than other university departments.

China’s technological capabilities remain heavily dependent on the West, prompting President Xi Jinping to prioritise technological self-sufficiency as a strategic goal. However, growing Western resistance to scientific collaboration with China has made international educational and research partnerships especially significant for the CCP, as it works to strengthen Chinese universities’ ties with foreign institutions to advance China’s innovation and technological development in particular.

The CCP sees education as a sector with fewer Western restrictions than the technology industry.

The CCP sees education as a sector with fewer Western restrictions than the technology industry. This makes education a strategic avenue for accessing Western expertise through international collaboration.

There are several methods for advancing scientific collaboration and gaining access to Western research. For the CCP, the most straightforward approach involves attracting Western scientists or doctoral candidates to work at Chinese research institutions or offering collaboration by establishing dedicated positions or even entire research laboratories in China.

INVOLVEMENT WITH THE CCP IS KEPT HIDDEN

Party officials in the Chinese education sector understand that the European Union and other Western research institutions are unlikely to transfer sensitive or valuable information to China willingly. As an alternative, Chinese researchers or doctoral candidates are sent to Western research institutions, or collaborative research labs are established in the target country. Efforts are made to obscure the CCP’s involvement in these projects. Chinese students and doctoral candidates’ party memberships may be temporarily suspended during their time overseas.

Various approaches are used to establish research labs. For example, when targeting information controlled by research institutions in major European countries, a proxy method may be used. This involves first establishing a research lab in another European country, which then facilitates collaboration with the target country’s research institution, effectively masking China’s involvement.

Larger collaboration projects may receive funding from Chinese companies, but the sources of this funding are not always transparent, raising concerns about potential influence activities.

Chinese institutions are generally more reserved than their Western counterparts when sharing data, infrastructure, and research results. This creates an imbalance in collaborative projects.

Researchers participating in Chinese-funded programmes may face loyalty conflicts or pressure to prioritise Chinese interests, raising ethical and security concerns about their affiliations. Furthermore, foreign researchers may feel pressured to avoid sensitive topics – such as China’s aggressive foreign policy, human rights, press freedom or its influence campaigns in the West – to preserve their relationships with Chinese institutions or secure funding. This leads to self-censorship and undermines academic integrity.

Another method for fostering international cooperation with Western universities is the establishment of Chinese language and culture centres. The aim is to use such institutions to train foreigners who are friendly to China and can promote bilateral relations across various fields.

Affiliations with the Chinese military or state institutions are often revealed with a simple internet search.

We want to remind our readers about the importance of carefully checking research partners’ backgrounds and previous publications when developing collaborations with China. Although China deliberately limits access to its databases of academic publications, affiliations with the military or state institutions are often revealed with a simple internet search.

We also want to highlight the use of targeting foreign individuals for recruitment purposes as a method associated with China. Attractive online offers are often orchestrated by individuals who operate from unfurnished rental offices in medium-sized Chinese cities, acting as intermediaries and, much like human traffickers, selling the initial contact to Chinese intelligence services in exchange for a finder’s bounty.