The Kremlin merely feigns interest in peace talks, hoping to restore its bilateral relations with the United States to their previous level and formalise Ukraine’s defeat. Despite this illusory thaw, Russia continues to regard the US as its principal adversary.
Aspiring to great-power status, Russia seeks to undermine the current international order by courting the so-called “global majority” and pressuring the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Russia’s attempt to topple Moldova’s pro-Western government has failed, but it will not be the last: the Kremlin will almost certainly learn from its mistakes and make another attempt to hijack Moldova’s statehood.
A US-brokered breakthrough in Armenia–Azerbaijan relations undermines Russia’s geopolitical interest. Russia is likely to launch an extensive influence campaign against Armenia in 2026.
In Moscow’s rhetoric, the Baltic Sea region is now described as the “Baltic–Scandinavian macro-region”. Russia uses this label to obscure its efforts to influence countries in this region and re-establish contacts with researchers and policymakers in the area.
Marginalised from respected Western political and cultural circles, Russia is constructing a parallel universe in which it awards its own peace prize on its own terms. The initiative illustrates how the Kremlin hopes covert influence can help shed its image as an aggressor state.
Russia has diversified its foreign-policy engagement in Africa. Expanding cooperation allows Moscow to spread anti-Western narratives, secure resources without triggering sanctions and funnel trapped students to the front.
Russia is facing increasingly severe economic challenges and is neglecting almost all non-military sectors as the war in Ukraine drags on. As a result, the risk of economic and social instability is set to rise in 2026.
In 2026, Russia is likely to impose even harsher measures to restrict access to independent information in online media. The Kremlin is systematically intensifying its ideological influence and indoctrination efforts aimed at young people. In the face of ongoing suppression of freedom of opinion and expression, the Kremlin continues to stage farcical elections. During the 2026 State Duma elections, it is likely to employ even greater pressure and control tactics than in the past.
Russia’s economy has entered a downturn. The defence sector is expanding at the expense of a contracting civilian economy. A complete collapse of the Russian economy remains highly unlikely.
Russia’s sanctions-strained military-industrial complex continues to function thanks to Kremlin proxies who ensure the continued flow of goods essential to the defence industry. Russia’s military intelligence service plays an active role in these efforts.
Russia is establishing large numbers of unmanned systems units across all services and branches of its armed forces. In any future conflict with Russia, allies must be prepared to face an adversary that employs unmanned systems at scale – at strategic, operational and tactical levels, on land, in the air and at sea.
Russia’s military-industrial complex has increased artillery ammunition production more than seventeenfold since 2021. This indicates that Russia is highly likely preparing for future conflict even as its war against Ukraine continues.
Russian army recruiters target socially vulnerable groups to meet quotas. Lawlessness, abuse of power and crime are widespread in the armed forces, posing a threat to both Russian society and neighbouring states.
Pyongyang is expanding its efforts internationally: the state spies on its partners and raises funds for its weapons programmes through its overseas labour diaspora.
China and Russia believe that the current era of geopolitical upheaval allows them to reshape the global balance of power in their favour. Although they mistrust one another, both believe they stand to gain more than they lose from cooperation.
The spread of DeepSeek serves several Chinese objectives: it helps launch China’s new industrial revolution and provides a channel for promoting Chinese propaganda in the West.
AI carries a range of serious risks alongside its many benefits. Mitigating these risks must occur at both the state and organisational levels by applying an AI-use strategy and organisational, ethical, legal and technical measures derived from it.
Estonia’s framework of measures for protecting classified information is largely uniform and offers little flexibility; however, as risk assessments date quickly, risk management must be continuous. Protection measures should therefore be determined on a risk basis at the points where information is created and processed.
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