Russia’s myth of agreements with Ukraine

By propagating this false narrative, the aggressor seeks to downplay its crimes and shift blame for its invasion onto Ukraine and the West. While it is true that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia lasted until April 2022, the claim that they were close to a resolution is far from accurate.

Naturally, Ukraine had a vested interest in swiftly halting Russia’s aggression in the spring of 2022. However, when it became apparent during the talks that Russia sought to achieve through agreements what it could not accomplish militarily, further negotiations became futile. While both sides tested each other’s willingness to make concessions, neither was prepared – or, in Ukraine’s case, in a position – to agree to terms, as the negotiations exposed Russia’s ruthless ambition to annul Ukraine’s sovereignty.

Our information indicates that Ukraine and Russia were far apart on fundamental issues, including the illegal occupation of Ukrainian territories and Ukraine’s future security guarantees, with no clear agreement in sight. Although negotiators publicly displayed goodwill, the differences were insurmountable.

After the Istanbul negotiations in late March 2022, Russia reiterated that the status of Donbas and Crimea was settled from its perspective. It repeated its original demands that any agreement must include recognising Crimea as part of Russia, recognising Donbas, Ukraine’s demilitarisation and “denazification”, sanctions and other bilateral matters.

Additionally, Russia demanded that its forces remain in occupied territories until all agreed conditions were met and that Ukrainian troops return to their permanent bases.

Ukraine rejected these demands, stating that no territorial concessions could be made without a public mandate through a referendum – a stance emphasised publicly by President Zelenskyy. As a compromise, Ukraine proposed freezing the question of Crimea’s status for 15 years. Ukraine also sought to include a reference in any agreement to the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which recognised Ukraine’s borders, including Crimea and Donbas. Russia rejected this proposal.

THE KEY ROLE OF GUARANTOR STATES

Russia sought to impose a cap on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces.

A central issue for Ukraine was securing its future against further Russian aggression. For Ukraine, the guarantor states participating in the agreement would need to ensure Ukraine’s security within its internationally recognised borders. Ukraine proposed allowing foreign troops in the country for self-defence, in cases of threats to sovereignty or for non-military purposes, such as disaster relief. Ukraine also called for measures like closing its airspace during attacks and allowing guarantor states to assist individually or collectively if consultations failed to resolve a threat. Russia, however, demanded that action be taken only with unanimous consent from guarantor states, effectively giving itself veto power over any response to threats against Ukraine. Russia also sought to impose a cap on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces: 85,000 troops and 15,000 national guardsmen. Ukraine rejected this condition, citing its defence and security needs.

Any proposed agreement to ensure Ukraine’s security would have required at least initial negotiations with the guarantor states, as Ukraine envisioned their role in both enforcing and implementing the agreement. Russia’s proposals undermined these efforts, reducing the role of guarantor states (except Russia) to a purely formal one. Meaningful engagement with guarantor states had not materialised before the negotiations collapsed in April 2022.

Russia also sought to limit Ukraine’s future status as an EU member state, demanding that Ukraine refrain from participating in any EU actions that could be construed as anti-Russian, such as sanctions. Another crucial condition for Russia was the lifting of existing sanctions. It even demanded that Ukraine advocate for sanctions relief at the UN and that all guarantor states also abandon sanctions.

RUSSIA DEMANDS OFFICIAL STATUS FOR THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE IN UKRAINE

Beyond this, Russia made sweeping demands to alter Ukraine’s legal framework, including constitutional amendments that would permanently curtail its sovereignty. For example, Russia required legal guarantees granting the Russian language equal status with Ukrainian as an official language and prohibiting the political activities of organisations and individuals deemed objectionable by Russia. The list of Ukrainian laws Russia sought to amend spanned several pages.

As of early 2025, there is renewed hope that the three-year war devastating Ukraine might come to some form of resolution. However, there is little reason to believe that Russia will abandon its original demands. Russia continues to exploit, both publicly and privately, the international community’s lack of awareness or memory regarding the state of negotiations in 2022.

In doing so, Russia perpetuates the myth that Ukraine and the West are responsible for prolonging the war, aiming to increase international pressure for concessions. Should meaningful peace talks occur in 2025, the stakes will be nothing less than Ukraine’s
future, the security of other European nations and the fundamental principles of the international security order.