Russia’s ambitions in South Caucasus and Moldova

RUSSIA AIMS TO RE-ESTABLISH MOSCOW’S CONTROL OVER MUCH OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER

Why does Russia covet the South Caucasus? To understand this, we must look at both history and geography. For more than 200 years, a significant portion of Russia’s communication and trade with the outside world has passed through its “window to Europe”. This has traditionally involved sea routes across the Baltic and overland connections through Scandinavia, the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine. However, since February 2022, this strategic window to Europe – and the world – stretching from Scandinavia to Ukraine has been closing.

Moscow assumes NATO would likely seize control of the Baltic Sea during a conflict.

Overland transit through the states mentioned above has either ceased entirely or dwindled significantly. NATO countries now surround the Baltic Sea, and from Russia’s perspective, its connections to the outside world are vulnerable here. Moscow believes that in the event of a conflict, NATO would likely take control of the Baltic Sea and impose a de facto blockade on Russia. Thus, Russia needs a new “window to the world”, and the South Caucasus is seen as the most suitable location for this purpose.

Controlling the South Caucasus would provide Russia with access to strategic infrastructure – railways, roads and ports. This infrastructure would connect Russia to the global market and grant Moscow access to regions it considers geopolitically and economically significant (Turkey and Iran, the broader Middle East, and markets in India and China).

Second, it would constitute an undeniable geopolitical victory, helping Russia gradually erode Western-imposed political isolation and economic sanctions while undermining Western unity and political resolve in its confrontation with Moscow.

Third, it holds military significance for Russia, considering the existing Russian military bases in Armenia and occupied territories in Georgia, as well as the potential to establish new naval bases along the Abkhazian and Georgian coastline on the Black Sea.

Russia’s relations with the South Caucasus states vary significantly. Azerbaijan and Russia have signed a treaty of allied relations, and cooperation between Baku and Moscow has evolved into a close, mutually beneficial partnership. This includes trade, the creation of key transit corridors, high-level political collaboration and bilateral intelligence cooperation. Azerbaijan’s subjugation to Russian control is neither feasible nor necessary, as its leadership already collaborates with the Kremlin, albeit solely to advance its own objectives.

A CORRIDOR THROUGH ARMENIA

One of Azerbaijan’s objectives is to establish a transit corridor through Armenia’s southern region. This would provide Azerbaijan with a land connection to the geographically separated Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic and, through it, to Turkey. It would create a direct route from Turkey and Black Sea ports to Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea – a strategically significant east-west transport corridor of interest to Russia as well.

Armenia has so far rejected proposals to create such a transit corridor across its territory under the terms demanded by Russia and Azerbaijan – essentially, an extraterritorial corridor controlled by Russian security forces (the FSB). Furthermore, Armenia’s political orientation presents a problem for Moscow. While much of the country’s economy and critical enterprises remain under the control of Russian capital, Armenia’s government has taken an openly pro-Western stance, and public opinion has turned increasingly anti-Russian. This shift stems from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war and subsequent military clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, during which Russia has supported Azerbaijan rather than Armenia.

For at least four years, Russia’s de facto goal has been to topple the government of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. So far, this has failed. However, another successful Azerbaijani military operation against Armenia could potentially achieve what Russia’s influence campaigns have not: a regime change in Yerevan and the reassertion of Moscow’s control over Armenian foreign policy.

This is where Georgia comes into play as the key to controlling the South Caucasus. Subjugating Georgia would give Russia access to Georgian ports on the Black Sea, as well as its transport networks and economic potential, which would help circumvent Western sanctions. At the same time, it would isolate Armenia geographically and politically: geographically, because Armenia’s only connection to the Western world runs through Georgia; and politically, because both Azerbaijan and Georgia would then tacitly support Russia’s efforts for a regime change in Armenia. This scenario would intensify domestic pressure on Pashinyan’s government to either step down or fully return to Moscow’s dictate.

Subjugating Georgia would thus be a two-for-one deal for Russia: take Tbilisi, and Yerevan comes with it. With Baku’s active participation, Moscow could open a new window to the world for Russia.

THE BATTLE FOR MOLDOVA

Last year, Moldova became the target of a massive Russian influence campaign, as predicted in our 2024 public report. The campaign had three objectives:

1. To disrupt the October 2024 referendum, which sought Moldovan citizens’ approval to amend the constitution with the goal of joining the EU. Moscow calculated that lowering voter turnout below 50% would be sufficient to argue later that Moldovans do not genuinely support EU membership.
2. To minimise incumbent President Maia Sandu’s vote share in the concurrent presidential election, where she was running for re-election.
3. To prepare for the Moldovan 2025 parliamentary election by promoting candidates serving Russian interests, testing various propaganda narratives, and refining influence campaign tactics and methods.

Unfortunately, Russia’s influence campaign succeeded on several fronts. The referendum nearly failed, with the “yes” vote prevailing by a razor-thin margin. Maia Sandu secured a decisive victory in the second round of the presidential election, but Russia’s preferred candidate, Alexandr Stoianoglo, garnered a considerable share of the vote. This was a significant accomplishment, considering that Stoianoglo had been politically irrelevant just six months before.

The influence campaign was likely one of the largest Russia has ever undertaken to interfere in foreign elections.

The key operative in the Russian influence campaign was Ilan Shor, a fugitive Moldovan oligarch and criminal who moved to Moscow last year and acquired Russian citizenship. The influence campaign itself was likely one of the largest, most complex and multi-layered operations Russia has ever conducted to interfere in the elections of another sovereign nation. Thousands of individuals were involved, leveraging tools such as social media platforms (Telegram and TikTok), leaflets and traditional television broadcasts. Voters were bombarded with cash handouts; opinion leaders were threatened and intimidated. Moldovan authorities have detailed the campaign’s specifics in extensive public reports.

Moldova will almost certainly face a similar influence campaign in 2025, during the lead-up to its parliamentary election in the summer or autumn. As a parliamentary republic, the composition of Moldova’s government and the direction of its executive branch depends on the outcome of this election. Russia’s key goal remains obstructing or at least delaying Moldova’s Western integration. To achieve this, Moscow will likely employ all available means to ensure victory for political forces under Russian control.