Belarus steamrolled by Russification

In July 2024, Belarus marked 30 years since Alexander Lukashenka came to power, putting an end to the country’s democratic development. During Belarus’s first and only free elections in 1994, Lukashenka promised voters to end the era of septuagenarian
leaders. Ironically, the dictator, who turned 70 last year, showed no sign of remembering that pledge when, in April 2024, he not only claimed another term as president – without recognition from the free world – but also assumed an additional role as chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a position formally superior to the presidency. Thus, the dictator now occupies two seats simultaneously: head of state and chairman of the People’s Assembly, which can issue directives to the presidency if needed. Should his health fail, he would likely retain the higher position as chairman.

Amendments to the Belarusian constitution in 2022 allow Lukashenka to remain in power until at least 2035. For his regime, retaining power, particularly in the 2025 presidential election, is merely a formality and a matter of coordination with Moscow. In response to mass protests that deeply alarmed him five years ago, Lukashenka has tightened repressive measures, enforcing harsh penalties for even minor expressions of dissent. The regime hopes that fear and disorganisation will force the public to resign themselves to 30 lost years.

Russia, as the real power behind Belarus’s repressive regime, is invested in keeping Lukashenka at the helm as a familiar and reliable figure. Amid its ongoing war against Ukraine and heightening confrontation with the West, in 2025, Russia will continue to dominate the foreign, economic and security policies of Belarus as the junior partner in the so-called Union State while allowing Lukashenka to operate with internal autonomy akin to a regional governor, maintaining the facade of a sovereign head of state. With Minsk having isolated itself internationally by aligning with Moscow and becoming increasingly dependent on Russia, Moscow intends to exploit Belarus’s weakness to eliminate any remnants of its sovereignty, leaving it with only formal statehood.

KREMLIN INTENSIFIES RUSSIFICATION EFFORTS

We know from experience that the Russian regime and its propagandist advisors have been troubled by the Belarusian regime’s occasional inconsistencies in implementing Russian influence, particularly between 2014 and 2019. During that period, according to propagandists linked to the Russian Presidential Administration, Lukashenka supported nationalist and émigré interpretations of Belarusian history and attempted to justify Belarus’s statehood through narratives involving Belarusian exiles, Soviet Belarus and
Poland. The regime even cracked down on pro-Putin activists who were critical of Lukashenka personally, forcing some to flee to Russia, and tried to curb the spread of Russian propaganda symbols.

The Belarusian regime’s stance once again became clearly pro-Russian after mass protests were suppressed in 2020–2021.

According to propagandists driving Russification in Belarus, the regime’s stance again became clearly pro-Russian after the suppression of mass protests in 2020 and 2021. Realising that his survival depended on Moscow’s support, Lukashenka began demonstrating loyalty to the Kremlin. In June 2021, the regime introduced a new public holiday, National Unity Day, celebrated on 17 September. The holiday marks the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland during World War II, carried out while it was allied with Nazi Germany, as well as the Soviet regime’s atrocities, including those against the Belarusian people. Less than a year later, Belarus allowed Russia to launch its invasion of Ukraine from Belarusian territory while providing logistical, material and propaganda support for the war, including organising migration attacks against the West.

Russia has “rewarded” its junior partner with intensified ideological Russification, much of it carried out through Lukashenka’s regime. For example, the Belarusian language is increasingly being marginalised in the education system, reduced to a mere dialect of Russian. The regime is branding efforts to promote Belarusian culture and national identity as aggressive anti-Russian nationalism, while extremist pro-Russian youth organisations, reminiscent of a “Putinjugend”, are gaining increasing influence. Moscow, on its part, pressures Belarus to establish ties with Russian occupation authorities in annexed Ukrainian territories.

The Russia-Belarus Union State, which celebrated its 25th anniversary on 8 December 2024, is also being praised by the Belarusian branch of the Moscow Patriarchate, curated from Moscow. Its leadership exhibits a mixture of hostility and fear towards Belarusian national traditions. A telling example of Russia’s approach in Belarus is the appointment of Vladimir Medinsky – a prominent Putin aide and notorious historical revisionist – as the Russian co-chair of the Russian-Belarusian Expert Advisory Council on History, formed in 2023. This reveals the Kremlin’s commitment to propaganda and historical manipulation in Belarus. In May 2025, Russia will further demonstrate its dominance over Belarus with joint commemorations of the 80th anniversary of its victory in World War II.

Lukashenko fears people fighting for Ukraine and a free Belarus.

Amid stagnation and the erosion of statehood, Lukashenka continues to play up the narrative of an ever-present Western threat, occasionally brandishing Moscow’s nuclear deterrent while presenting himself and Russia as the sole guarantors of Belarusian independence. In reality, Lukashenka does feel threatened, but his fear is directed more at Belarusian volunteers fighting for Ukraine and a free Belarus than at any Western power. The real threat to Belarus lies not in the West, but in Russia, which seeks to reduce Belarus to a mere province under Kremlin control, using local puppets in Minsk to enforce its agenda.