Russia seeks partners among Persian Gulf states

Russia’s efforts to build relationships with Persian Gulf states aim to alleviate its isolation from Western economies and diplomacy while spreading its narratives about the war in Ukraine. These efforts focus primarily on key regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

These efforts culminated in President Putin’s visits to both countries in late 2023. Almost certainly, the purpose of these visits was not only to sign bilateral agreements but also to demonstrate that Russia remains engaged internationally. The Persian Gulf states, in their pursuit of independent foreign policies, diversified economic relations and neutrality in the Ukraine war, have remained open to engagement with Russia, albeit to varying degrees.

SAUDI ARABIA, A SOUGHT-AFTER PARTNER

As Russia’s oil sector is the primary source of revenue for its war-strained state budget, it is crucial for Moscow to influence global energy prices. To this end, Russia collaborates with Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, within the OPEC+ framework. For Saudi Arabia, shaping the energy market to align with its interests is equally important, as it seeks to implement resource-intensive reforms and projects under the Saudi Vision 2030 initiative, which is aimed at reducing the country’s reliance on oil revenues in the long term. As a result, Russia and Saudi Arabia have repeatedly agreed to cut oil production within the OPEC+ framework, though Russia has often violated these agreements to serve its own interests. Russia’s duplicity in this regard has caused significant friction in its relations with Saudi Arabia.

Russia views relations with Saudi Arabia as a priority, although cooperation beyond OPEC+ remains marginal.

While collaboration with Saudi Arabia as a regional powerhouse is a priority for Russia, cooperation outside OPEC+ remains marginal. Bilateral trade is limited to Russia’s exports of fertilisers and agricultural products to Saudi Arabia, with minimal mutual investment. The cooperation with Russia is somewhat hampered because of Saudi Arabia’s strong alliance with the US and the fact that Saudi Arabia follows the US sanctions policy more carefully than other Persian Gulf states. For example, it is difficult for Russia’s nuclear energy company Rosatom to secure a contract to build Saudi Arabia’s first nuclear power plant. This issue has been raised repeatedly by Moscow, even at the highest levels. US pressure is also likely behind Saudi Arabia’s hesitant stance towards BRICS membership, which has caused frustration on the Russian side.

Russia’s recognition of Saudi Arabia’s importance is demonstrated by its decision to abandon plans to arm Yemen’s Houthi rebels after Saudi Arabia objected. These weapons would have bolstered Houthi attacks on Western vessels in the Red Sea but would also have been perceived as a security threat by Saudi Arabia. This plan was likely a retaliatory response to Western considerations of arming Ukraine with longrange precision weapons. However, Russia only respects the positions of Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, when these align with its strategic interests. This balancing act between opposing sides undermines trust in Russia and prevents the development of strong alliances with some Gulf states.

Although interactions at political and other levels are regular and constructive, Saudi Arabia has often responded cautiously to Russia’s active efforts to enhance cooperation. This likely reflects Saudi Arabia’s consideration of the sanctions imposed on Russia, its limited economic and other capacities, as well as Saudi Arabia’s close ties with Western countries, particularly the US. This dynamic is unlikely to change in the medium term. At the same time, it is worth noting Saudi Arabia’s ambitions to become a global trade hub, similar to the UAE, which implies greater openness to countries like Russia.

THE UAE IS OPEN TO PARTNERSHIP

Compared with Saudi Arabia, the UAE is significantly more open to cooperation with Russia. Most of Russia’s economic activities in the Gulf region are centred on the UAE, which offers greater business freedom and more opportunities to circumvent sanctions than other Gulf states because, unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE is less susceptible to US pressure. As a result, thousands of Russian companies, including numerous shell entities involved in the export and re-export of sanctioned goods to Russia, are now registered in the UAE. The UAE also hosts the majority of Russia’s shadow fleet, which is used for crude oil exports. Moreover, many wealthy Russians, business figures and oligarchs, such as Roman Abramovich, have relocated to the UAE. The country remains a popular tourist destination for Russian citizens, and its importance as a hub for Russia is underscored by Moscow’s reported consideration of acquiring a local airport.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE is already collaborating with Russia in the field of nuclear energy. For example, Rosatom supplies nuclear fuel to the Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE. Rosatom’s plans include expanding atomic energy cooperation with the UAE, including joint projects in third countries. Additionally, Rosatom collaborates with UAE companies in other sectors, such as logistics. Notably, Rosatom and the UAE logistics company DP World have entered a cooperation agreement and established a joint venture, International Container Logistics LLC, to develop infrastructure for container shipping along the Northern Sea Route by 2028.

At the political level, relations between Russia and the UAE are close and, at times, almost familial. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, whose fluency in Arabic and cultural knowledge have helped foster bilateral ties, frequently visits the region. Coordination also occurs in intelligence and military affairs, particularly regarding conflicts in Libya and Sudan. However, their cooperation goes beyond coordination: it is almost certain that the UAE has provided financial or military support (or both) to the Wagner Group in Libya and likely in Sudan as well.

Russia and Gulf states collaborate on infrastructure projects for mineral extraction in Africa.

Russia’s cooperation with UAE in Africa is not limited to conflict zones and also includes joint infrastructure projects aimed at improving access to and export of natural resources. One known joint venture between Russia and the UAE, Emiral Resources, operates gold mines in West Africa.

Russia-UAE relations are diverse and close; further expansion is likely and will include various forms of cooperation, both overt and covert, in third countries.

RUSSIAN ARMS IN THE GULF REGION

The threat of terrorism and tensions in the Middle East drive Gulf states to supplement their arsenals with Russian-made weapons.

The persistent threat of terrorism and rising tensions in the Middle East prompt Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to expand their arsenals, including with Russian-made weapons, which are often cheaper and come with fewer conditions. Diversifying their arms supply chains also gives these states more freedom in domestic and foreign policy decisions.

Russia’s cooperation with Gulf states in military technology is spearheaded by the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (Федеральная служба по военно-техническому сотрудничеству, FSVTS). This state institution coordinates Russia’s military-technical exports and also serves as a cover for Russian intelligence operatives working under the guise of FSVTS representatives in foreign countries, including the Gulf. FSVTS facilitates connections between Russian defence manufacturers and potential Gulf partners, organising regular intergovernmental meetings. Russian participants include defence companies like Rosoboronexport, Vysokotochnye Kompleksy (VTK) and Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (KBM), alongside representatives of the Ministry of Defence and the Presidential Administration. On the Gulf side, state defence bodies like Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Military Industries and the UAE’s Tawazun Council, as well as private companies such as International Golden Group (now part of the UAE’s EDGE conglomerate), represent their interests.

Currently, the military-technical cooperation between Russia and Saudi Arabia is modest. Talks on acquiring S-400 air defence systems and Su-35 fighter jets have, to the best of our knowledge, not led to signed contracts, although Saudi Arabia is reported to have purchased the Pantsir-S1 air defence system in early 2024. Recent talks have also explored the possibility of producing Russian weaponry within Saudi Arabia, while Russia, according to Rosoboronexport, is exploring broader production opportunities across the Middle East.

The UAE is showing significantly more significant interest in Russian arms. It has already purchased Pantsir-S1 air defence systems, plans to establish a maintenance centre for its modernisation and has acquired BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. The UAE has also shown strong interest in other Russian air defence systems, UAVs and AI developments. Some of these systems are re-exported to third countries, likely to Africa and also Yemen, with Russian approval.

While Gulf states maintain a consistent interest in Russian arms, these weapons are technologically inferior to their Western counterparts. Moreover, Russia’s defence industry is heavily focused on meeting domestic military demands due to the war in Ukraine, limiting its capacity to fulfil foreign orders. As a result, Russian arms are unlikely to expand their presence in Saudi and UAE arsenals significantly, remaining a minor component in their overall military inventories.