Russian think tanks promote Kremlin interests in the West

Think tanks focused on foreign policy, which outwardly seek to emulate their Western counterparts, were established in Russia in the 1990s, primarily based on Soviet-era state research institutes. While think tanks in democratic nations aim to highlight critical issues and provide policymakers with independent expertise, Russian research institutes have always been subordinate to the state apparatus. This trend has deepened amid aggression against Ukraine, transforming these institutions into tools for carrying out Kremlin and intelligence directives aimed against the “unfriendly” West.

Independent think tanks, as understood in the West, with intellectual autonomy or significant influence over public opinion and political decisions on foreign policy do not exist in Russia. All similar Russian entities – whether state-funded research institutions or private think tanks reliant on corporate donations – operate under strict control. Researchers are expected to align with and promote the Kremlin’s foreign policy line in their publications, speeches and direct interactions with Western colleagues. Those few dissenters who have dared to criticise official policy, even mildly, have been publicly denounced and removed from their positions. The rest have either left Russia, adapted to the constraints (i.e. accepted censorship) or adopted a more rigidly pro-Kremlin stance than before.

Think tank experts help the Kremlin generate new ideas and rationalise Putin’s decisions to the public.

Although Russian think tanks do not directly influence the strategic direction set by the ruling elite, they play a significant support role in decision-making. They have extensive expertise on the countries and issues within their focus areas, which is why they are often engaged in shaping Russia’s foreign policy and covert influence plans. These experts help decision-makers generate new ideas and rationalise Putin’s foreign policy actions to domestic audiences.

Think tanks typically receive assignments from state institutions well in advance, often in the form of a list of topics to address over the next six months or a year. However, they also handle last-minute ad hoc requests with tight deadlines and may proactively offer their services. Research institutions must vie for the client’s attention against input from intelligence agencies and other state bodies, whose contributions frequently hold greater influence in the decision-making process.

THE KREMLIN SENDS DELIBERATE FALSE SIGNALS

Over the past three years, the role of shadow diplomacy has grown significantly. With official contacts between Russia and representatives of “unfriendly” nations effectively frozen, the Kremlin and its intelligence services have increasingly relied on select Russian experts for discreet communication with Western diplomats and influential think tank members. Through these intermediaries, the Kremlin has deliberately sent misleading signals to Western decision-makers, suggesting either that Putin might be open to concessions in Ukraine or, conversely, issuing veiled threats of imminent nuclear escalation should the West provide Ukraine with excessive support. This nuclear rhetoric is likely intended to stoke fears of escalation among Western policymakers, aided by Russian-aligned experts in the West.

The Kremlin and Russian special services also use these think tank intermediaries to gather valuable intelligence on the prevailing sentiments among Western policymakers and opinion leaders. For example, they seek insights into “red lines”, the extent of war fatigue and the conditions under which dialogue might be possible. Feedback received from Western partners in a trusting environment is subsequently reported to the Presidential Administration and special services, where it informs the preparation of new active measures.

As with other instruments of covert influence operations, raising awareness of how Russia employs these tactics and the objectives it seeks to achieve can significantly undermine their effectiveness.

Consideration should also be given to limiting the operational freedom of Russian research institutes in the West. How are Russian think tank representatives, who recite Kremlin or intelligence talking points to their Western contacts as ostensibly independent experts, different from spokespersons for Russian state media? Both exploit Western freedom of speech and spread disinformation. Western nations largely recognise the security risks posed by Russian state media and have significantly curtailed their influence through sanctions. A similar approach should be applied to Russian think tanks operating in the West.