Russia seeks influence in the Global South

In 2025, Russia’s opposition to the West is expected to intensify. Amid the war in Ukraine, Russia is gearing up for a prolonged confrontation with NATO, which implies bolstering its western border with additional military units over the medium to long term. Putin likely views a resolution to this conflict as achievable only through a Yalta-style agreement – that is, dividing Europe into spheres of influence, undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty and dismantling Europe’s broader security framework. In any potential negotiations, Putin is likely to reintroduce the broader security demands presented to the US and NATO in December 2021, alongside his ultimatums on Ukraine. This package represents an effort to mitigate Russia’s geopolitical setbacks, particularly Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO. A central demand from the December 2021 proposal was the withdrawal of NATO’s military presence to its 1997 boundaries.

Russia’s disinformation narratives are gaining traction in Global South countries.

In 2024, Russia’s presidency of BRICS and the hosting of the BRICS summit in Kazan marked a key moment in its pivot towards the Global South. This role, along with the numerous events surrounding the summit, offered Russia valuable opportunities to spread propaganda and legitimise its invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s disinformation narratives are gaining traction in Global South countries, and it benefits even when these nations only declare neutrality in the war. By leveraging the economic interests and war fatigue of BRICS and Global South countries, Russia seeks to undermine support for Ukraine and diminish the chances of Zelenskyy’s Peace Formula succeeding. At the same time, Russia works to secure international backing, or at least tacit agreement, for its preconditions for negotiations: Ukraine must declare neutrality and relinquish the territories occupied by Russia.

The expansion of BRICS is strategically advantageous for Russia, as it demonstrates a multipolar world order and the declining global role of the West as a sustained trend. While the inclusion of new countries adds complexity to BRICS’ internal dynamics and consensual decision-making, it opens additional opportunities for Moscow to strengthen bilateral relationships and bolster its international influence. Most importantly, it allows Russia to project an image of not being isolated on the global stage.

Russia’s goal is to decouple the international financial system, or at least BRICS trade, from the US dollar.

Russia’s strategic goal, and Putin’s personal ambition, is to decouple, as far as possible, the international financial system, or at least BRICS trade, from the US dollar. Moscow actively promotes these aims among Global South countries. Reducing the dollar’s role is a long-term process, and significant progress is unlikely during this year due to the diverse financial systems of member states. For example, economic agreements between member states and the adoption of a new payment system to replace SWIFT would be necessary. Still, weakening the global position of the US dollar aligns with the shared interests of Russia and China, making the gradual reduction of dollar-based trade in the Global South likely over the coming years.

RUSSIA’S HOSTILITY TOWARDS ESTONIA REMAINS UNCHANGED

As Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine enters its fourth year, relations between Estonia and Russia remain predictably at a low, with no signs of improvement in the near future. Russia views Estonia as a hostile state, primarily because of Estonia’s unwavering support for democratic Ukraine and its pro-Western integration efforts. This hostility includes potential deterrent measures against Estonia.

Russia’s perception of the threats posed by the Baltic region has grown.

Although Russia’s approach to the Baltic states has not fundamentally shifted, its perception of threats in the region has grown. Following the onset of war and Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, Russia’s strategic position in the Baltic Sea has weakened and long-term risks have heightened. For Moscow, potential risks such as the blocking of Kaliningrad’s access routes and the closure of the Gulf of Finland to maritime traffic require preventive actions and the development of possible countermeasures. Avoiding any restrictions on maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea is economically vital for Russia, as approximately 60% of its oil exports rely on Baltic ports.

Russia’s toolkit for political countermeasures against Estonia has not fundamentally changed since before February 2022. It continues to influence and exploit the Russian-speaking population to serve its interests and attempts to deepen societal divisions. Tools in Russia’s arsenal against the Baltic states include migration weaponisation, but also intimidation and sabotage. However, effective means of exerting economic pressure on Estonia through trade relations have largely been exhausted.

Russia’s influence operations in the Baltic states still rely heavily on the local branches of the Russian Orthodox Church, which act under the directives of Russia’s leadership and special services. To pressure the Baltic states, Russia continues to spread historical distortions and international smear campaigns about the persecution of Orthodox Christians. Under the guise of defending Orthodoxy and traditional values, it also seeks to consolidate its network of influence agents, who actively promote disinformation narratives.